I was digging into a new version of Strela Stealer the other day and I figured it may help someone if I wrote a quick blog post about it. This post is not an in-depth analysis of the packer. It’s just one method of quickly getting to the Strela payload.
Author: @d4rksystem It has been a while since I’ve touched a malicious RTF document and I’ve been itching to refresh my knowledge in this area. The tricky part was finding a maldoc worth investigation. Well, my luck recently changed – along came a maldoc lure that targeted guests of the 2023 NATO Summit in Lithuania …
I was investigating a malware sample that uses an interesting trick to circumvent sandboxes and endpoint defenses by simply deleting its zone identifier attribute. This led me on a tangent where I began to research more about zone identifiers (which, embarrassingly enough, I had little knowledge of prior). Here are the results of my research. …
Since my new book “Evasive Malware: Understanding Deceptive and Self-Defending Threats” pre-order just launched, I wanted to write up a quick summary of the book, including what you’ll learn, the book’s target audience, and a breakdown of each section in the book. Let’s get started! What is this book about? “Evasive Malware: Understanding Deceptive and …
Modern malware has gotten better and better at detecting sandbox and analysis environments, and at evading these environments. Malware can circumvent defenses, sandboxes, and analysts by using various techniques such as VM detection, process injection, and guardrails. In particular, guardrails are one or more artifacts that malware looks for on the host before executing its …
I recently was investigating a memory dump from a host infected with BlackEnergy3. BlackEnergy3, which is a modified version of the original BlackEnergy malware families, was used in the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in 2015. BlackEnergy3 is similar to its version 2 counterpart, but has been modified with additional modules that serve multiple …
Many malware families are still using fairly trivial techniques for the detection of virtual machine environments. Once malware detects that it may be running in a virtual machine, it may terminate itself, or worse, execute code that will cause a diversion and potentially lead the malware analyst down the wrong paths :O Malware often uses …
Many malware families still use simple evasion techniques for detection of virtual machine environments and malware analysis sandboxes. These simple checks are enumerating things on the host such as processes, certain files and directories, specific drivers and hardware configurations, and registry keys that may give away the presence of a hypervisor. If a virtual machine is …
One beautiful and sunny evening, I happened to be poking around VirusTotal – because that’s what I do with sunny evenings – and I happened to come across an interesting CV-themed document. It was an Excel document entitled “Chantay’s Resume.xlsm”. This caught my eye mostly because resume’s should almost never be in Excel format. Unless …
Every once in a while, malware will surprise me with a new technique, or a new method of implementing an older technique. It’s kind of like malware analysis Christmas. Unpacking a gift (the malware) and getting a new toy. Nevermind. Anyway, I was looking into a new “sLoad” sample the other day. “sLoad” is a …
Ryuk has been in operation since mid-2018 and is still one of the key ransomware variants operating in 2020. The threat actors behind Ryuk have been known to target a wide range of industries, and they typically demand substantial ransom amounts. Lately, given the ongoing COVID-19 situation, the actors behind Ryuk have been taking advantage …
In an earlier post, I wrote a technical analysis of the Ryuk ransomware and its behaviors. This post is a follow-up to that, for whoever is interested in learning one method of unpacking a Ryuk sample. As explained in my previous post, Ryuk will typically try to inject itself into several processes running on the …
Sometimes I come across a tool that makes me stop and think what I have been doing all my life life without it. This is how I feel about hollows_hunter. Hollows_hunter is essentially a tool for automatic extraction of evil objects and malicious code from memory. The tool is able to hunt for things such …
I truly dislike Javascript-based malware. Deobfuscation of Javascript is, to me, annoying at best – and rage-inducing at worst. I love unpacking and analyzing PE executables, DLL’s, and the like, but I tend to avoid Javascript analysis when possible. However, in the world of malware, sometimes you must face your annoying, rage-inducing enemy in the …
I often run into obfuscated PowerShell while analyzing malicious documents and executables. Malware authors have many reasons for obfuscating their PowerShell activities, but mostly they do it to tick me off for the lulz. There are a few good ways (and many bad ways) to tear apart PowerShell scripts and discover what they are doing …
This is a quick post to outline a few ways to extract and identify useful strings for creating quality Yara rules. This post focuses on Windows executable files, but can be adapted to other files types. Let’s start with an overview of the types of strings we are interested in when developing Yara rules. tl;dr …